REPORT 05 OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS (A-25)
"Protecting Physicians Who Engage in Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services"
(D-140.951)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Policy D-140.951, "Establishing Ethical Principles for Physicians Involved in Private Equity Owned Practices," asks that the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) to "study and clarify the ethical challenges and considerations regarding physician professionalism raised by the advent and expansion of private equity ownership".

Increasing investments by private equity firms in health care raise ethical concerns regarding dual loyalties of physicians and competing interests between profits and patients. The ethical concerns raised by private equity firms' incursion into health care warrant extreme caution. To respond to these issues, CEJA recommends amending Opinion 11.2.3, "Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services" to more clearly encompass partnerships with private equity firms and the ethical dilemmas and obligations that they raise for both physicians seeking capital to support their private practice as well as physicians entering into employment contracts with private equity-owned health care entities.

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS*

CEJA Report 05-A-25

Subject: Protecting Physicians Who Engage in Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services

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Referred to: Reference Committee on Ethics and Bylaws

Policy D-140.951, "Establishing Ethical Principles for Physicians Involved in Private Equity Owned Practices," asks our American Medical Association (AMA) to "study and clarify the ethical challenges and considerations regarding physician professionalism raised by the advent and expansion of private equity ownership", the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (CEJA) presented Report 02-A-23, Report 03-A-24, and Report 02-I-24, which offered recommendations on amending Opinion 11.2.3, "Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services." The last report was referred back to CEJA at the 2024 Interim Meeting, with testimony expressing a desire that a stronger stance be taken against private equity's (PE) involvement in health care, noting that the report placed too high of a bar on physicians contracting with private equity and needs stronger language to guide physicians working for private equity investors. CEJA acknowledges that private equity investment in health care raises pressing, complex issues, which will ultimately require multiple avenues to address, such as the related Council on Medical Service report (CMS 03-A-25) on private equity and the corporate practice of medicine as well as work currently being done by our AMA's Advocacy unit to promote physician-led care and reduce burnout. The present report has been revised in light of the valuable comments proffered at the last meeting, and offers specific ethics analysis and guidance for physicians impacted by private equity's involvement in medicine.

BACKGROUND

The past several decades have seen an increase in the corporatization, financialization, and commercialization of health care [1,2]. Since 2018, more physicians now work as employees of hospitals or health care systems rather than in private practice [3,4]. Our AMA reports that this trend is continuing: "[e]mployed physicians were 50.2 percent of all patient care physicians in 2020, up from 47.4 percent in 2018 and 41.8 percent in 2012. In contrast, self-employed physicians were 44 percent of all patient care physicians in 2020, down from 45.9 percent in 2018 and 53.2 percent in 2012" [4]. A major factor in these trends has been the incursion of private equity into health care. It is estimated that private equity capital investment between 2000 and 2018 grew from $5 billion to $100 billion [1]. Between 2016 and 2017 alone, the global value of private equity deals in health care increased 17 percent, with health care deals compromising 18 percent of all private equity deals in 2017 [5].

Private equity firms use capital from institutional investors to purchase private practices, typically utilizing a leveraged buy-out model that finances the majority of the purchase through loans for which the physician practice serves as security, with the goal of selling the investment within three

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to seven years and yielding a return of 20-30 percent [1,5,6]. However, private equity investment broadly encompasses many types of investors and strategies, including venture capital firms that primarily invest in early-stage companies for a minority ownership, growth equity firms that tend to partner with promising later-stage ventures, and traditional private equity firms that borrow money through a leveraged buyout to take a controlling stake of mature companies [7]. Private equity firms represent a unique business model within health care due to their primary focus, not on goods or services, but on quick returns on financial investment, emphasis on fulfilling promises to investors, and treatment of health care entities as not substantially different from non-health related investments.

When ownership shifts from physicians to private equity firms, the firms typically seek to invest resources to expand market share, increase revenue, and decrease costs to make the practice more profitable before selling it to a large health care system, insurance company, another private equity firm (as a secondary buyout), or the public via an initial public offering (IPO) [8]. To expand market share, private equity typically employs a "platform and add-on" or "roll-up" approach in which smaller add-ons are acquired after the initial purchase of a large, established practice, allowing private equity firms to gain market power in a specific health care segment or sub-segment [1,9]. These practices by private equity appear to be driving mergers and acquisitions within health care, significantly contributing to the consolidation of the health care industry that has dramatically increased over the past decade [9].

Proponents of private equity investments in health care claim that private equity provides access to capital infusions, which may facilitate practice innovation and aid in the adoption of new technological infrastructure [6,8]. Proponents also advocate that private equity can bring "valuable managerial expertise, reduce operational inefficiencies, leverage economies of scale, and increase healthcare access by synergistically aligning profit incentives with high quality care provision" [10].

Critics argue that private equity's focus on generating large, short-term profits likely establishes an emphasis on profitability over patient care, which creates dual loyalties for physicians working as employees at private equity-owned practices [5,6]. Critics further assert that prioritizing profits likely jeopardizes patient outcomes, overburdens health care companies with debt, leads to an over-emphasis on profitable services, limits access to care for certain patient populations (such as uninsured individuals or individuals with lower rates of reimbursement such as Medicaid or Medicare patients), and fundamentally limits physician control over the practice and clinical decision making [5,8,10].

While more empirical research is needed on the impacts of private equity investment in health care, there is a growing accumulation of evidence that private equity investment results in negative outcomes, including increases in costs, decreases in the quality of patient care, and decreases in patient satisfaction [10-13]. This is particularly worrisome as private equity firms are emerging to be major employers of physicians. Currently, it is estimated that 8 percent of all private hospitals in the U.S. and 22 percent of all proprietary for-profit hospitals are owned by private equity firms [14].

Relevant Laws

Fuse Brown and Hall write that despite the market consolidation that results from private equity acquisitions within health care, these acquisitions generally go unreported and unreviewed since they do not exceed the mandatory reporting threshold under the Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act and

that there are currently no legal guidelines for assessing the collective market effects of add-on acquisitions. However, they do note:

> Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, federal antitrust authorities—the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice —can sue to block mergers and acquisitions where the effect of the transaction may be "substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." To determine whether a transaction may threaten competition, antitrust agencies analyze whether the transaction will enhance the market power of the transacting parties in a given geographic and product market. […] Typically, the FTC oversees health care acquisitions (other than insurance).[1]

To protect patients from harmful billing practices, the federal government has passed the No Surprise Act, the False Claims Act, Anti-Kickback Statute, and Stark Law. Additionally, most states have similar laws, such as those barring fee-splitting and self-referral, and several states have passed laws regulating or restricting the use of gag clauses in physician contracts [1]. In 2024, the FTC also issued a final rule banning noncompete clauses in all employment contracts; while a district court issued an order stopping the FTC from enforcing the rule, the FTC has appealed that decision [15].

The federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act ensures that hospitals with an emergency department provide all patients access to emergency services regardless of their ability to pay. Similarly, federal law requires nonprofit hospitals, which account for 58 percent of community hospitals, provide some level of charity care as a condition for their tax-exempt status, which the Internal Revenue Service defines as "free or discounted health services provided to persons who meet the organization's eligibility criteria for financial assistance and are unable to pay for all or a portion of the services" [16].

While there is no federal law banning the corporate practice of medicine (CPOM), most states do have CPOM laws that prohibit corporations from owning or operating medical practices. However, these state laws typically include exceptions that allow corporate investors, such as private equity firms, to invest in health care entities through a physician management company or management services organization, and which also provide potential avenues for corporate investors to circumvent stringent limits on their operational authority.

Relevant AMA Policy Provisions

Council on Medical Service Report 11-A-19 reviewed the scope and impact of private equity and venture capital investment in health care, and its recommendations were adopted as Policy H-160.891, "Corporate Investors." This policy delineates 11 factors that physicians should consider before entering into partnership with corporate investors, including alignment of mission, vision, and goals; the degree to which corporate partners may require physicians to cede control over practice decision making; process for staff representation on the board of directors and medical leadership selection; and retaining medical authority in patient care and supervision of nonphysician practitioners.

Our AMA further developed and published materials to assist physicians contemplating partnering with private equity and venture capital firms:

- Venture Capital and Private Equity: How to Evaluate Contractual Agreements
- Model Checklist: Venture Capital and Private Equity Investments
- Snapshot: Venture Capital and Private Equity Investments

Policy H-310.901, "The Impact of Private Equity on Medical Training," encourages GME training institutions and programs to "demonstrate transparency on mergers and closures, especially as it relates to private equity acquisition" and asserts that our AMA will "[s]upport publicly funded independent research on the impact that private equity has on graduate medical education."

Policy H-385.926, "Physician Choice of Practice," states that "[o]ur AMA supports the freedom of physicians to choose their method of earning a living (fee-for-service, salary, capitation, etc.)." While this policy upholds physician autonomy and supports the freedom of physicians to choose where and how they practice, the right to choose a method of earning a living is not unbounded, as the policy also states that physicians should charge their patients fair fees and provide "adequate fee information prior to the provision of services" whenever possible.

Additionally, policy H-215.981, "Corporate Practice of Medicine," states, "[o]ur AMA opposes the corporate practice of medicine and supports the restriction of ownership and operational authority of physician medical practices to physicians or physician-owned groups." This policy recognizes the attendant risks that the corporate practice of medicine represents to both patients and the practice of medicine.

Relevant AMA *Code Provisions*

Opinion 10.1.1, "Ethical Obligations of Medical Directors," states that physicians in administrative positions must uphold their core professional obligations to patients. The opinion mandates that physicians in their role as medical directors should help develop guidelines and policies that are fair and equitable, and that they should always "[p]ut patient interests over personal interests (financial or other) created by the nonclinical role."

Opinion 11.2.1, "Professionalism in Health Care Systems," acknowledges that "[p]ayment models and financial incentives can create conflicts of interest among patients, health care organizations, and physicians" and offers recommendations for physicians within leadership positions regarding the ethical use of payment models that influence where and by whom care is delivered. Key elements include the need for transparency, fairness, a primary commitment to patient care, and avoiding overreliance on financial incentives that may undermine physician professionalism.

Opinion 11.2.2, "Conflicts of Interest in Patient Care," clearly states: "[t]he primary objective of the medical profession is to render service to humanity; reward or financial gain is a subordinate consideration. […] When the economic interests of the hospital, health care organization, or other entity are in conflict with patient welfare, patient welfare takes priority."

Opinion 11.2.3, "Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services," stipulates that physicians' fundamental ethical obligation to patient welfare requires physicians to carefully consider any contract to deliver health care services they may enter into to ensure they do not create untenable conflicts of interest. The opinion states that physicians should negotiate or remove "any terms that unduly compromise physicians' ability to uphold ethical standards." However, it should be acknowledged that physicians have little leverage in changing entire payment structures or reimbursement mechanisms when negotiating their contracts with hospitals. Similarly, physicians in private practice often feel that they have little leverage in negotiating the sale of their practice; they simply receive an offer and are told they can take it or leave it.

Opinion 11.2.3.1, "Restrictive Covenants," states: "[c]ovenants-not-to-compete restrict competition, can disrupt patient care, and may limit access to care" and that physicians should not enter into covenants that "[u]nreasonably restrict the right of a physician to practice medicine for a

specified period of time or in a specified geographic area on termination of a contractual relationship". However, many hospitals and hospital systems today now routinely include noncompete clauses as part of their physician contracts. These clauses put physicians at risk of violation of professional obligations and their widespread use has the potential to undermine the integrity of the profession as a whole. While the FTC issued a rule in April 2024 banning most noncompete agreements, a Texas District Judge issued a preliminary injunction on July 3, 2024, halting the enforcement of the ban.

ETHICAL ANALYSIS

The increasing corporatization and financialization of health care have generated legitimate concerns over ethical dilemmas they raise regarding a focus on profits at the expense of patient care. Prioritizing profits over patients is incompatible with physicians' ethical obligations. In other words, because it is unethical for physicians to place profit motives above commitments to patient care and well-being, when private equity firms invest in health care, their business model is prima facie ethically problematic for physicians. Private equity's primary objective of fast profit-making in order to uphold their promises to investors is at odds with physicians' primary obligation of acting in the patient's best interest.

However, although private equity-owned health care entities are different in their ownership structure and oversight compared to other traditional health care investors, private equity-acquired health care entities may not be substantively different from other for-profit and non-profit health care entities in terms of their stated goals of both solvency and patient care. Zhu and Polsky argue that private equity is not inherently unethical and that there are likely good and bad actors as is the case in many sectors [6]. They add: "physicians should be aware that private equity's growth is emblematic of broader disruptions in the physician-practice ecosystem and is a symptom of medicine's transformation into a corporate enterprise" [6].

The corporatization of medicine comes with ethical and professional risks that are perhaps best exemplified by private equity but are not unique to private equity alone. One only needs to turn to the systemic failure of nonprofit hospitals to provide adequate charity care or how for-profit hospitals often reduce access to care (particularly for Medicaid recipients) to see examples of how the corporatization and financialization of medicine has increasingly come to treat health care as a mere commodity [17,18]. This is despite the fact that health care is inherently different from normal market goods because the demand for health care is substantially inelastic and nonfungible, and medical knowledge is a social good collectively produced by the work of generations of physicians, researchers, and patients. The real problem with private equity's involvement in health care is that it blatantly reveals that as a society, we have increasingly moved towards treating health care as a commodity when as a profession, we know this should not be the case.

While business ethics and medical ethics are not inherently antithetical, differences do clearly exist [19]. Many physicians are thus justly concerned about any removal of professional control that may accompany the increasing commercialization of the physician's role. Veatch points out that paradoxically, despite being open to the profit motive in the practice of medicine, the profession as a whole has shown strong resistance to the commercialization of medical practice. For Veatch, the crux of the issue is whether people perceive health care as a fundamental right or a commodity like any other, adding that the notion of health care as a right jeopardizes any profit motive in health care including traditional private practitioner fee-for-service models [19].

Pellegrino offers a similar analysis, arguing that health care is not a commodity but rather a human good that society has an obligation to provide in some measure to all citizens [20]. Pellegrino

argues that health care is substantively different from traditional market goods—it is not fungible, cannot be proprietary because medical knowledge is possible only due to collective achievements, is realized in part through the patient's own body, and requires an intensely personal relationship—and thus cannot be a commodity. Pellegrino warns that the commodification of health and medicine turns any interaction between the patient and physician into a commercial transaction subject to the laws and ethics of business rather than to medical and professional ethics. "In this view," Pellegrino writes, "inequities are unfortunate but not unjust […]. In this view of health care, physicians and patients become commodities too" [20].

As health care has become increasingly commodified, the ethical risks to patients and physicians are being realized as physicians find themselves increasingly working as employees and worrying about the impact commercial enterprises—such as private equity investments—may be having on patients.

Private equity represents the latest and most extreme form of health care commercialization that has escalated over the past few decades. This is the very reason why private equity firms became interested in health care in the first place—they recognized that health care as a market was already ripe for investment and future profitability. Private equity firms use the same investment models in health care that they do in other industries—invest in fragmented markets, acquire the most promising targets as a platform, expand through add-on acquisitions, and exit the market once a significant consolidation of market share can secure a sale, secondary buyout, or IPO [9]. Each individual acquisition is typically too small to require review by anti-trust regulators at the FTC; at the same time, however, this practice is driving the trend of mergers and acquisitions in the health care sector [9].

Fuse Brown and Hall explain, "[private equity] functions as a divining rod for finding market failures—where PE has penetrated, there is likely a profit motive ripe for exploitation" [1]. They continue that private equity investments pose three primary risks:

> First, PE investment spurs health care consolidation, which increases prices and potentially reduces quality and access. Second, the pressure from PE investors to increase revenue can lead to exploitation of billing loopholes, overutilization, upcoding, aggressive risk-coding, harming patients through unnecessary care, excessive bills, and increasing overall health spending. Third, physicians acquired by PE companies may be subject to onerous employment terms and lose autonomy over clinical decisions [1].

While the profit motive of private equity firms may drive them to take part in less than scrupulous practices, such as private equity's exploitation of out-of-network surprise billing, there is also potential for private equity to play a more positive role in transforming health care practices [1,21]. Powers et al write:

> Ultimately, private equity—a financing mechanism—is not inherently good or bad. Instead, it acts to amplify the response to extant financial incentives. Within a fee-for-service construct, this is intrinsically problematic. But value-based payment models can serve as an important guardrail, helping to ensure that financial return to private equity investors are appropriately aligned with system goals of access, quality, equity, and affordability [21].

Private equity firms could help accelerate changes in health care payment and delivery towards value-based models. With such models, where financial performance is tied to quality and value, private equity may be incentivized to invest in changes that support better health and lower costs [21].

While more research is needed on the impacts of private equity investments in health care and on de-investment, when private equity firms ultimately pull out of a health care sector, private equity firms' involvement in health care does not appear to be exceptional within the current corporate transformation of the profession. As Fuse Brown and Hall point out, "PE investment in health care is just the latest manifestation of the long trend of increasing commercialization of medicine. And so long as the U.S. treats health care as a market commodity, profit-seeking will persist" [1]. Any financing model of health care that ignores patient care or puts profits over patient care should be considered unethical by physicians and the public.

Concerns over private equity's incursion into health care are clearly warranted. However, the financial and investment landscape of health care continues to evolve, and while private equity may be the latest trend it will not be the last version that emerges within the health care marketplace. Health care spending in the US continues to rise each year, with health spending increasing by 4.1 percent in 2022 for a total of $4.5 trillion and accounting for roughly 17 percent of total GDP [22]. With so much money involved in health care, it is bound to draw in investors; the involvement of investors from outside of health care, who may treat it as merely a market commodity and do not share physicians' overriding commitment to patient care and well-being, should be concerning. Such involvement by outside investors is likely to further transform health care, driving consolidation, commercialization, and de-professionalization.

In a practical approach to the current financial health care landscape, Ikrum et al offer some realistic recommendations for partnering with private equity in health care:

> While PE involvement in health care delivery invokes inherent concerns, it has provided much-needed capital for many primary care practices to mitigate the effects of the pandemic and to potentially undertake care delivery innovations such as population health management under value-based payment models. To make partnerships with private investors work, providers need to select the right investors, establish strategies upfront to address misaligned objectives, and define a successful partnership by setting goals for and transparently reporting on indicators that reflect both financial and clinical performance. Safeguards and regulations on sales may also protect patients and providers [7].

While private equity's overriding profit motive may be unethical in many instances, the reality is that private equity is already a large player in health care and physicians urgently need guidance on how to interact with private equity firms and private equity-owned health care entities. Keeping within its purview, the *Code* should offer guidance to physicians and to the practice of medicine on how to best interact with private equity and other outside forces that increasingly impact health care today. To support physicians as private equity continues to increase its market share of health care entities, practical guidance is needed related to both the sale of physician-owned practices to private equity as well as to those seeking employment by private equity-owned health care entities to help physicians navigate today's evolving financial health care landscape. Guidance is also needed for physicians employed by corporate entities that interact with the health care profession, including by private equity firms, management service organizations (MSOs), professional services corporations (PCs), insurance companies, and pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs).

CONCLUSION

The ethical concerns raised by private equity investments in health care are not unique but instead represent ethical dilemmas that exist due to the very nature of treating health care as a commodity. As highlighted by policy H-215.981, "Corporate Practice of Medicine," it is not some corporate practices but all corporate practices of medicine that create the potential for ethical dilemmas and

so should be avoided. Any decision to pursue financial incentives over and above patient care is unethical, and physicians' concerns regarding private equity's focus on short-term profits at the expense of patients' and their own well-being are justly warranted. Due to such concerns, physicians should strongly consider whether they can sell their practice to private equity investors while also upholding their ethical and professional obligations to patients and to the profession as a whole. Such reflection is also warranted for any physician considering employment by a corporate entity, such as a private equity firm, MSO, PC, insurance company, or PBM.

It is therefore crucial that policy guidelines be developed to ensure that private equity-acquired hospitals, hospital systems, and physician practices function in an ethical manner that prioritizes patients and patient care over profits. Policies that require greater transparency and disclosure of data on private equity ownership, greater state regulatory control over private equity acquisitions, closing payment and billing loopholes, rules requiring an independent clinical director on the Board of private equity firms engaged in health care, and means for physicians to help set goals and measure outcomes to ensure the alignment of corporate and clinical values should be considered [7]. The growth of private equity investment within the health care marketplace is clearly concerning and is an urgent issue that needs greater regulatory oversight. Beyond established ethical and professional norms, new regulations must be developed to prevent private equity from negatively impacting patient care and the medical profession [6]. A new Senate Budget Committee Bipartisan Staff Report, released in January 2025, calls for greater oversight, transparency, and restrictions of private equity involvement in health care [23]. While the report acknowledges that "not every PE firm operates in an identical fashion, the evidence highlights systemic issues with PE in investment in health care," and goes on to conclude, "the findings of the investigation call into question the compatibility of private equity's profit-driven model with the essential role hospitals play in public health. The consequences of this ownership model—reduced services, compromised patient care, and even complete hospital closures—potentially pose a threat to the nation's health care infrastructure, particularly in underserved and rural areas" [23].

Because the private equity business model creates serious potential risks and conflicts of interest for the practice of medicine, it is essential for physicians considering entering into partnership with private equity firms to first reflect on their ethical and professional obligations. If they do decide to proceed, however, physicians have a duty to evaluate their contracts and require that the agreements are consistent with the norms of medical ethics. Likewise, physicians considering entering into a contractual relation as an employee—whether with a private equity-owned hospital or otherwise—should ensure that their contract does not place them in an untenable conflict of interest or compromise their ability to fulfill their ethical and professional obligations to patients [8]. While we must acknowledge that physicians often have little power in contract negotiations, their ethical obligation remains nonetheless to try to negotiate when contractual agreements are likely to lead to ethical dilemmas. If a contract would prevent a physician from upholding their professional ethical obligations, the contract should not be entered into.

The Preamble to the *Code* stipulates that "[o]pinions of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs lay out the ethical responsibilities of physicians as members of the profession of medicine." Although some areas of concern therefore extend beyond what the *Code* may speak to, CEJA is currently studying the ethical obligations of health care entities that interact with physicians and is considering entering a report in the near future regarding the potential need for a new opinion to address additional stakeholders involved in our evolving health care landscape. CEJA recognizes that private equity investment raises concerns for physicians and for the practice of medicine but also acknowledges the *Code* is unable to speak to the totality of the issues raised by such investment practices. This is why it is crucial that multiple AMA units, such as the Council on

Medical Service's related report on private equity, work in tandem to address the complexity of the many issues raised by private equity firms' investment in health care entities.

It is the conclusion of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs that increasing investment by private equity firms in health care raises ethical concerns regarding dual loyalties of physicians and competing interests between profits and patients. To respond to these issues, CEJA recommends amending Opinion 11.2.3, "Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services," to more clearly address concerns raised by entering into partnerships with private equity firms, physicians employed by corporate entities (including private equity firms, MSOs, insurance companies, and PBMs), and the ethical risks that may arise for both physicians seeking capital to support their private practice as well as physicians entering into employment contracts with private equity-owned health care entities.

RECOMMENDATION

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommends that Opinion 11.2.3, "Contracts to Deliver Health Care Services," be amended by addition and deletion as follows and the remainder of this report be filed:

> Prioritizing profits over patients is incompatible with physicians' ethical obligations. No part of the health care system that supports or delivers patient care should place profits over such care. Physicians have a fundamental ethical obligation to put the welfare of patients ahead of other considerations, including personal financial interests. This obligation requires ~~them to~~ that before entering into contracts to deliver health care services, physicians consider carefully the proposed contract to assure themselves that its terms and conditions ~~of contracts to deliver health care services before entering into such contracts to ensure that those contracts~~ do not create untenable conflicts of interest or compromise their ability to fulfill their ethical and professional obligations to patients. Those physicians who enter into contracts with corporate entities, such as private equity firms, management service organizations, professional services corporations, insurance companies, or pharmaceutical benefit managers, who act within their capacity as a physician, even as administrators or intermediaries, also have a duty to uphold the ethical obligations of the medical profession.
>
> Ongoing evolution in the health care system continues to bring changes to medicine, including changes in reimbursement mechanisms, models for health care delivery, restrictions on referral and use of services, clinical practice guidelines, and limitations on benefits packages. While these changes are intended to enhance quality, efficiency, and safety in health care, they can also put at risk physicians' ability to uphold professional ethical standards ~~of informed consent and fidelity to patients~~ and can impede physicians' freedom to exercise independent professional judgment and tailor care to meet the needs of individual patients.
>
> As physicians seek capital to support their practices or enter into various differently structured contracts to deliver health care services—with group practices, hospitals, health plans, investment firms, or other entities—they should be mindful that while ~~many~~ some arrangements have the potential to promote desired improvements in care, ~~some~~ other arrangements ~~also~~ have the potential to ~~impede~~ put patients' interests at risk and to interfere with physician autonomy.
>
> When contracting with entities, or having a representative do so on their behalf, to provide health care services, physicians should:

(a) Carefully review the terms of proposed contracts, preferably with the advice of legal and ethics counsel, ~~or have a representative do so on their behalf~~ to assure themselves that the arrangement:

(i) minimizes conflict of interest with respect to proposed reimbursement mechanisms, financial or performance incentives, restrictions on care, or other mechanisms intended to influence physicians' treatment recommendations or direct what care patients receive, in keeping with ethics guidance;

(ii) does not compromise the physician's own financial well-being or ability to provide high-quality care through unrealistic expectations regarding utilization of services or terms that expose the physician to excessive financial risk;

(iii) ~~allows~~ ensures the physician can ~~to~~ appropriately exercise professional judgment;

(iv) includes a mechanism to address grievances and supports advocacy on behalf of individual patients;

(v) is transparent and permits disclosure to patients~~.~~;

(vi) enables physicians to have significant influence on, or preferably outright control of, decisions that impact practice staffing;

(vii) prohibits the corporate practice of medicine.

(b) Negotiate modification or removal of any terms that unduly compromise physicians' ability to uphold ethical or professional standards.

When entering into contracts as employees, preferably with the advice of legal and ethics counsel, physicians should:

(c) Advocate for contract provisions to specifically address and uphold physician ethics and professionalism.

(d) Advocate that contract provisions affecting practice align with the professional and ethical obligations of physicians and negotiate to ensure that alignment.

(e) Advocate that contracts do not require the physician to practice beyond their professional capacity and provide contractual avenues for addressing concerns related to good practice, including burnout or related issues.

(f) Not enter into any contract that would require the physician to violate their professional ethical obligations.

When contracted by a corporate entity involved in the delivery of health care services, physicians should:

(g) Terminate any contract that requires the physician to violate their professional ethical obligations and report any known or suspected ethical violations through the appropriate oversight mechanisms.

1 (Modify HOD/CEJA Policy)

Fiscal Note: Less than $500

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