

REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON MEDICAL SERVICE

CMS Report 02-I-22

Subject: Corporate Practice of Medicine
(Resolution 721-A-22)

Presented by: Lynn Jeffers, MD, MBA, Chair

Referred to: Reference Committee J

1 At the 2022 Annual Meeting, the House of Delegates referred Resolution 721, “Amend Policy
2 H-215.981, ‘Corporate Practice of Medicine’,” which was sponsored by the Resident and Fellow
3 Section. Resolution 721-A-22 asked the American Medical Association (AMA) to “amend AMA
4 Policy H-215.981, ‘Corporate Practice of Medicine,’ by addition of a fourth clause that reads: ‘4.
5 Our AMA acknowledges that the corporate practice of medicine has led to the erosion of the
6 physician-patient relationship, erosion of physician-driven care and created a conflict of interest
7 between profit and training the next generation of physicians.’”
8

9 The referral of Resolution 721-A-22 included specific concern that the study should include the
10 impact of the corporate practice of medicine on all practice types. The Board of Trustees assigned
11 this item to the Council on Medical Service for a report back to the House of Delegates. The
12 Council notes that a related report is being presented by the Council on Medical Education at this
13 meeting (CME Report 1-I-22 “The Impact of Private Equity on Medical Training”). The Council
14 recognizes that private equity and corporate investors are becoming increasingly involved in
15 graduate medical education, residencies, fellowships, and training of non-physician practitioner.
16 We have chosen to focus this report on the general aspects of the corporate practice of medicine.
17

18 BACKGROUND

19
20 The Council recently prepared CMS Report 11 at the 2019 Annual Meeting which addressed a
21 similar topic. The corporate practice of medicine is broadly defined as non-physician investment in
22 medical practices. Two examples of corporate medicine include private equity investment funds
23 and physician management groups. Private equity funds are pooled investments used to buy
24 controlling shares of companies or other entities. After taking control, private equity funds
25 typically streamline the business (which often includes cutting costs and reducing the ability for
26 prior physician owners to make governance decisions) with the goal of selling the business for a
27 profit in three to seven years. The types of investment range from venture capital (VC) firms that
28 primarily invest in early-stage companies in exchange for minority ownership to more traditional
29 private equity firms that borrow money to take a controlling stake in mature yet undervalued or
30 underperforming companies through leveraged buyout deals.¹ Alternatively, a practice
31 management company is a privately held or publicly traded for-profit company that manages the
32 back-end administrative functions of medical practices, such as insurance contracting and billing.
33 Many practice management companies, often referred to as staffing companies, also contract with
34 hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers to provide professional staffing and management
35 services. Investments in practice management companies by private equity funds have led to an
36 increase in their utilization.²

1 While the extent of corporate investment in physician practices is not precisely known, a growing
2 number of physicians are employed by corporations including hospitals, health systems, and
3 insurers. Concerns regarding these partnerships have primarily centered on the potential for
4 subsequent increases in prices, service volume, and internal referrals, as well as the use of
5 unsupervised non-physician practitioners. An array of factors has led to these changes, including
6 changes in payment and delivery models, physician payment challenges, high costs of new
7 technology and equipment, and increased administrative and regulatory burdens.

8
9 In addition to employment by hospitals, health systems, and insurers, private equity firms and
10 publicly traded for-profit corporations may invest in physician practices. Increasingly, private
11 equity firms have acquired majority and/or controlling interests in entities that manage physician
12 practices. However, there is little peer-reviewed evidence regarding the impact of these
13 arrangements on physicians, patients or health care prices, and physician opinions vary. Hospitals,
14 health systems, academic medical centers, large multispecialty groups, and corporate buyers
15 frequently compete with private equity investors for the same physician practice targets. Corporate
16 buyers may also partner with private equity investors or form consortia of buyers to acquire highly
17 sought-after practices. Increased competition for physician groups in some specialties has led price
18 valuations of these practices to rise. Because many private equity transactions are not disclosed
19 (non-disclosure agreements are commonly used), the degree of investment in physician practices,
20 while believed to be relatively small overall, cannot be precisely determined. Incomplete data on
21 corporate transactions involving physician practices is a significant impediment to determining the
22 impact of corporate investors on physicians, patients, and the health care marketplace.³

23 24 *State-by-State Differences*

25
26 Generally, corporate practice of medicine doctrines prohibit corporations from practicing or
27 interfering with the practice of medicine. The doctrines arise from state medical practice acts and
28 are based on a number of public policy concerns, such as: (1) allowing corporations to practice
29 medicine will result in the commercialization of the practice of medicine; (2) a corporation's
30 obligation to its shareholders may not align with a physician's obligation to their patients; and
31 (3) corporate interests may interfere with the physician's independent medical judgment.⁴ It is
32 important to note that while most states have a prohibition on the corporate practice of medicine,
33 every state provides an exception for professional corporations and many states provide an
34 exception for employment of physicians by certain entities. For example, some states explicitly
35 permit hospitals to employ physicians, some states allow nonprofit hospitals to employ physicians,
36 and other states recognize an unwritten exception to the corporate practice of medicine for
37 hospitals employing physicians.⁵ Many states that allow hospitals to employ physicians specifically
38 prohibit the hospital from interfering with the independent medical judgment of the physician,
39 thereby protecting the autonomy of the physician's clinical decision-making.⁶ For example, in
40 California and Indiana, clinics and hospitals may employ physicians as long as the entity does not
41 direct or control independent medical acts, decisions or judgments of the licensed physician. On the
42 other hand, in Colorado and Arkansas, all shareholders and officers of a medical corporation must
43 be licensed physicians, consistent with each state's licensing laws. In Texas, state laws allow
44 critical access hospitals, sole community hospitals, and hospitals in counties with fewer than
45 50,000 people to employ physicians, with the requirement that physicians must "retain independent
46 medical judgment in providing care to patients at the hospital or other health care facilities owned
47 or operated by the hospital and may not be disciplined for reasonably advocating for patient care."⁷

48
49 Recently, there have been complaints filed in state courts arguing that some of these firms have
50 overstepped and are in violation of state corporate practice of medicine doctrines. One example of
51 this is a lawsuit filed in California by the American Academy of Emergency Medicine Physician

1 Group (AAEM-PG) against Envision Healthcare Corporation. In its filing, AAEM-PG alleges that
2 Envision is in violation of the state’s corporate practice of medicine doctrine, as Envision either
3 forms new medical groups with non-physician officers or “installs Envision executives or officers
4 in pre-existing medical groups.” Specifically, the lawsuit alleges that Envision: “decides how many
5 and which physicians to hire, their compensation and work schedule...controls and influences
6 advertising for physician vacancies, vetting physicians, establishing the terms of employment, the
7 physician’s rate of pay, scheduling the hours physicians will work, staffing levels, the number of
8 patient encounters and working conditions...when to terminate physicians and denies them rights
9 to appeal via traditional medical staffing mechanisms...negotiates the groups’ contracts with third-
10 party payers and health insurers and decides whether the group will agree to the terms...physicians
11 are not made aware of the terms of their contracts with third-party payers.” The lawsuit was
12 originally filed in December 2021. In May 2022, a judge for the United States District Court for the
13 Northern District of California denied Envision Healthcare’s motion to dismiss the case; therefore,
14 the case remains ongoing. The American College of Emergency Physicians and the California
15 Medical Association have both filed amicus briefs in support of AAEM-PG.⁸ Further details and
16 copies of court documents can be found on <https://www.aem.org/envision-lawsuit>.

17
18 As previously stated, there is limited data on the extent of physician practice acquisition by private
19 equity firms; however, private equity acquisition of physician practices increased from 59 deals in
20 2013 to 136 deals in 2016.⁹ In April 2022, *JAMA Health Forum* published data on the geographic
21 variations in private equity penetration of physician practices (defined as the share of physicians in
22 private equity-acquired practices) across six specialties: dermatology, gastroenterology,
23 ophthalmology, obstetrics/gynecology, orthopaedics, and urology. Private equity penetration was
24 highest in the Northeast (6.8 percent) and lowest in the Midwest (3.8 percent). Twelve states and
25 the District of Columbia (DC) have an above average share of physicians in private equity
26 practices, while eleven states have no identified acquisitions. States with the highest private equity
27 penetration are Washington, DC (18.2 percent), Arizona (17.5 percent), New Jersey (13.6 percent),
28 Maryland (13.1 percent), Connecticut (12.6 percent), and Florida (10.8 percent). By specialty,
29 private equity penetration was highest in dermatology, followed by gastroenterology,
30 ophthalmology, obstetrics/gynecology, and orthopaedics.¹⁰

31 32 *Risks and Benefits*

33
34 As with any practice type, there are risks and benefits associated with entering into corporate
35 partnerships. Risks include loss of control over the physician practice and future revenues, loss of
36 autonomy in decision-making, an emphasis on profit or meeting financial goals, potential conflicts
37 of interest, and potential uncertainties for non-owner early and mid-career physicians. Additionally,
38 after a buyout there could be added layers of bureaucracy that could add burdens to physicians.
39 Examples could be new checks and balances or updated workflows. Benefits include financially
40 lucrative deals for physicians looking to exit ownership of their practices, access to capital for
41 practice expenses or expansions (which may relieve physicians’ financial pressures), potentially
42 fewer administrative and regulatory burdens on prior practice owners, and centralized resources for
43 certain functions such as IT, marketing, and human resources.

44
45 There can also be risks to patients when physicians enter into these agreements. Recent evidence
46 has shown a 10 percent increase in short-term mortality in private equity-owned nursing homes
47 compared to non-private equity owned nursing homes. This is possibly due to decreases in nursing
48 staff and declines in compliance with federal and state standards of care.¹¹ Another study
49 evaluating private equity acquisitions of US hospitals demonstrated increased charges, increased
50 net income, and increased patient risk scores, along with fewer Medicaid patients admitted, after
51 private equity acquisition relative to control groups.¹² A third study showed that private

1 equity-owned dermatology practices were associated with 3 percent-5 percent higher prices for
 2 routine medical visits at 1.5 years after acquisition as compared with non-private equity-owned
 3 practices. Other studies have shown increased rates of surprise billing, overutilization of high-
 4 margin or low-value services, and pressure to up-code charges after private equity acquisition.¹³

5
 6 *Impact on Patient-Physician Relationship*

7
 8 Research is ongoing about the effects of corporate medicine investment on patient outcomes and
 9 cost-savings. A study of 176 hospitals acquired by private equity firms during 2005-2014 was
 10 conducted to compare financial performance to matched control hospitals.¹⁴ Private equity
 11 acquisition of short-term acute care hospitals was associated with decreased costs per discharge and
 12 increased margins. The study highlights early findings on the impact private equity investment has
 13 on the health care system. Preliminary data show that financial performance improved after
 14 acquisition; however, patient utilization of services increased, and staffing decreased. Importantly,
 15 the study found that the decline in total costs per discharge was not adjusted for total full time
 16 hospital personnel, which suggests that hospitals cut costs in other dimensions, not only labor, after
 17 private equity acquisition. The authors of the study note that although improved financial
 18 performance occurred broadly, the findings are not evidence that gains in efficacy translate to
 19 improved patient outcomes or clinical experiences in either the short or long term.¹⁵

20
 21 Under private equity investment, maintaining physician autonomy and a physician-led care team is
 22 crucial. Physicians should retain complete control of clinical decision making, as well as decisions
 23 regarding who is a member of their care team. Care provided by non-physician practitioners has
 24 been shown to be more costly than care provided by a physician-led team. An example of this is at
 25 the Hattiesburg Clinic in Mississippi. An examination of cost data for the South Mississippi
 26 system's accountable care organization (ACO) revealed that care provided by non-physician
 27 practitioners working on their own patient panels was more expensive than care delivered by
 28 physicians. The 2017-2019 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) cost data on
 29 Medicare patients without end-stage renal disease and who were not in a nursing home showed that
 30 per-member, per-month spending was \$43 higher for patients whose primary health professional
 31 was a nonphysician instead of a physician. This finding could translate to \$10.3 million more in
 32 spending annually if all patients were followed by non-physician practitioners. Citing the results of
 33 the clinic's study, researchers found that "the results are consistent and clear: By allowing
 34 advanced practice providers to function with independent panels under physician supervision, we
 35 failed to meet our goals in the primary care setting of providing patients with an equivalent value-
 36 based experience." These findings underscore the importance of physician-led care teams,
 37 regardless of business model or private equity investment, both to control costs and improve patient
 38 outcomes.¹⁶

39
 40 **AMA POLICY**

41
 42 Long-standing AMA policy states that physicians are free to choose their mode of practice and
 43 enter into contractual agreements as they see fit.

44
 45 Policy H-215.981 opposes federal legislation preempting state laws prohibiting the corporate
 46 practice of medicine; states that the AMA will continue monitoring the corporate practice of
 47 medicine and its effect on the patient-physician relationship, financial conflicts of interest, and
 48 patient-centered care; and directs the AMA to provide guidance, consultation, and model
 49 legislation regarding the corporate practice of medicine, at the request of state medical associations,
 50 to ensure the autonomy of hospital medical staffs, employed physicians in non-hospital settings,
 51 and physicians contracting with corporately-owned management service organizations.

1 Policy H-285.951 states that physicians should have the right to enter into whatever contractual
2 arrangements they deem desirable and necessary but should be aware of potential conflicts of
3 interest due to the use of financial incentives in the management of care.

4
5 Policy H-215.968 supports and encourages competition between and among health facilities as a
6 means of promoting the delivery of high-quality, cost-effective care.

7
8 Policy H-225.947 encourages physicians who seek employment as their mode of practice to strive
9 for employment arrangements consistent with a series of principles, including: (a) physician
10 clinical autonomy is preserved; (b) physicians are included and actively involved in integrated
11 leadership opportunities; (c) physicians are encouraged and guaranteed the ability to organize
12 under a formal self-governance and management structure; (d) physicians are encouraged and
13 expected to work with others to deliver effective, efficient, and appropriate care; (e) a mechanism
14 is provided for the open and transparent sharing of clinical and business information by all parties
15 to improve care; and (f) a clinical information system infrastructure exists that allows capture and
16 reporting of key clinical quality and efficiency performance data for all participants accountability
17 across the system to those measures.

18
19 Policy H-160.960 states that when a private medical practice is purchased by corporate entities,
20 patients shall be informed of the ownership arrangement by the corporate entities and/or
21 physicians. Policy H-160.891 lists guidelines for physicians to consider when they are
22 contemplating corporate investor partnerships. These guidelines include: (a) how the practice's
23 current mission, vision, and long-term goals align with those of the corporate investor; (b) due
24 diligence should be conducted that includes, at minimum, review of the corporate investor's
25 business model, strategic plan, leadership and governance, and culture; (c) external legal,
26 accounting and/or business counsels should be obtained to advise during the exploration and
27 negotiation of corporate investor transactions; (d) retaining negotiators to advocate for best
28 interests of the practice and its employees should be considered; (e) whether and how corporate
29 investor partnerships may require physicians to cede varying degrees of control over practice
30 decision-making and day-to-day management; (f) the potential impact of corporate investor
31 partnerships on physician and practice employee satisfaction and future physician recruitment; (g)
32 a clear understanding of compensation agreements, mechanisms for conflict resolution, processes
33 for exiting corporate investor partnerships, and application of restrictive covenants; (h) corporate
34 investor processes for medical staff representation on the board of directors and medical staff
35 leadership selection; and (i) retain responsibility for clinical governance, patient welfare and
36 outcomes, physician clinical autonomy, and physician due process under corporate investor
37 partnerships. Additionally, Policy H-160.891 states that the AMA supports improved transparency
38 regarding corporate investment in physician practices and subsequent changes in health care prices;
39 encourages national medical specialty societies to research and develop tools and resources on the
40 impact of corporate investor partnerships on patients and the physicians practicing in that specialty;
41 and supports consideration of options for gathering information on the impact of private equity and
42 corporate investors on the practice of medicine.

43 44 DISCUSSION

45
46 The Council recognizes that private equity investment and the corporate practice of medicine are
47 continuing to change the health care landscape. This report describes various investment
48 opportunities and their impact on medical practice. Anecdotally, there have been challenges
49 associated with the corporate practice of medicine and evidence that some investment firms have
50 overstepped and could be in violation of state corporate practice of medicine doctrines. It is clear

1 that in order to control spending and provide optimal care for patients, care teams should be
2 physician-led.

3
4 The AMA has long-standing policy that supports a physician's right to choose their mode of
5 practice and type of employment, and we acknowledge that investor partnerships can be lucrative
6 and successful. The AMA has published several resources and ethical opinions to guide physicians
7 as they make the choice that is best for them.

8
9 The Council recommends new policy to address the concerns outlined in this report, including the
10 potential to erode the patient-physician relationship and create conflicts of interest in medical
11 education. In addition, the Council recognizes that the nature of corporate investor relationships
12 could potentially change in the future and recommends amending Policy H-160.891 regarding
13 corporate investors to strengthen the physician's role in clinical decision-making, medical
14 education, and determining the composition of the care team.

15
16 RECOMMENDATIONS

17
18 The Council on Medical Service recommends that the following be adopted in lieu of Resolution
19 721-A-22, and the remainder of the report be filed:

- 20
21 1. That our American Medical Association (AMA) acknowledge that the corporate
22 practice of medicine has the potential to erode the patient-physician relationship. (New
23 HOD Policy)
24
25 2. That our AMA acknowledge that the corporate practice of medicine may create a
26 conflict of interest between profit and best practices in residency and fellowship
27 training. (New HOD Policy)
28
29 3. That our AMA amend Policy H-160.891 by addition of two new clauses, as follows:
30 j. Each individual physician should have the ultimate decision for medical judgment in
31 patient care and medical care processes, including the supervision of non-physician
32 practitioners.
33 k. Physicians should retain primary and final responsibility for structured medical
34 education inclusive of undergraduate and graduate medical education including the
35 structure of the program, program curriculum, selection of faculty and trainees, as well
36 as educational and disciplinary issues related to these programs. (Modify Current HOD
37 Policy)
38

Fiscal Note: Less than \$500.

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- ⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
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